SHEL-2026-001 Critical 9.5

Compromised eMudhra certificate authority in the device trust store

Severity
Critical, CVSS 4.0 base score 9.5
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:L
CVE
None assigned
Fixed in
1.7.6, 2.0.3 and 2.1.1 (stable); 2.2.0-beta2 (beta); 2.3.99-cameraprod13 (Shelly cameras)
Published
9 November 2026
Updated
17 November 2026 (version 1.1)

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Summary

Shelly devices check the TLS certificate of each server they connect to against a list of trusted root certificates built into the firmware. Older firmware trusted two root certificates under which eight eMudhra intermediate certificate authorities were issued. The private keys of those intermediates could be recovered, so they must be treated as compromised.

Firmware 1.7.6, 2.0.3 and 2.1.1, and 2.3.99-cameraprod13 for Shelly cameras, remove these roots from the device trust store. We recommend that all users update their devices.

Affected products

Shelly Gen2 and newer devices (Plus, Pro, Gen3 and Gen4), including Shelly BLU Gateway and Shelly cameras, on the firmware versions below.

Firmware lineAffectedFixed in
1.xEarlier than 1.7.61.7.6
2.02.0.x earlier than 2.0.32.0.3
2.12.1.x earlier than 2.1.12.1.1
2.2 (beta)2.2.0-beta12.2.0-beta2
Shelly camerasEarlier than 2.3.99-cameraprod132.3.99-cameraprod13

Background

On 17 October 2026, Mozilla received a report that the private keys of eight eMudhra intermediate certificate authorities, six for TLS and two for code signing, had been compromised. eMudhra revoked all eight on 18 October 2026 and describes the cause as cryptographically weak keys. Mozilla published its response on 20 October 2026 and has removed the root "emSign ECC Root CA - G3" from its trusted root list.

Browsers are protected through their own update and revocation mechanisms. Shelly devices rely only on the trust store built into their firmware, so the affected roots had to be removed with a firmware update.

The roots removed are "AAA Certificate Services" (Sectigo, formerly Comodo) and "emSign ECC Root CA - G3" (eMudhra). The update also brings the full trust store in line with the current Mozilla root list, which removes further roots that Mozilla no longer trusts.

Impact

Anyone holding one of the compromised keys can create a certificate for any domain name, and a device on older firmware would accept it as valid. An attacker who can also intercept the device's network traffic, for example through a compromised router, a rogue Wi-Fi network or DNS hijacking, could impersonate any HTTPS, MQTT or WebSocket server that the device checks against its built-in trust store. This includes the Shelly cloud connection, MQTT brokers set up by the user and servers called by user scripts.

Such an attacker could read credentials and tokens that the device sends, and forge commands or responses, for example to switch outputs, change the configuration or alter what a script does.

Connections for which the user uploaded their own CA certificate do not use the built-in trust store and are not affected.

What to do

Exploitation

Shelly is not aware of this issue being exploited against Shelly devices.

Acknowledgements

Shelly thanks a member of the Shelly community for reporting this issue.

References

Revision history

VersionDateChange
1.09 November 2026Initial publication
1.117 November 2026Moved to security.shelly.com; links updated. No change to the technical content.

This advisory is provided “as is” as of the date of publication and may be updated as new information becomes available. To report a security issue, see Report a vulnerability and our Vulnerability Disclosure Policy.